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INTRODUCTION

Imagine waking up in jail one morning. The day before, you had a few
drinks at a friend's house while you watched the big game. On the drive home,
you rolled through a stop sign in your neighborhood. In spite of the blue lights
flashing behind you, you drove the rest of the block, coming to a stop in your
driveway.' Getting out of your car, you realized that you left your walletdriver's license inside-at your friend's house.2 The officer arrested you after
you failed a field sobriety test. Due to an indiscretion while you were an
undergraduate, this DUI charge will be your second. 3 Your attorney tells you
that he thinks that the solicitor may agree to drop the charges for driving
without a license and failure to stop for blue lights in exchange for a guilty
plea to driving under the influence with a sentence of five days and a
substantial fine. After you speak with your lawyer, you call your wife. She
tells you that she can get the money together for the fine if you need her to.
Next, you call the friend who invited you over the day before. You tell him
that, if anyone asks, you need him to say that you only had a few drinks in the
hours before the arrest.
The next day, the solicitor approaches your attorney with an offer of a
plea deal: five days and a hefty fine for the DUI. Your attorney, considering
the initial offer to be the beginning rather than the end of negotiations,
counters with an offer comprised of no jail time. The solicitor reiterates his
initial offer. He mentions your call to your friend, saying that jurors frown on
witness tampering. The plea deal you were previously uncertain of is now
your best option.
In South Carolina, as in much of the country,' it is a common practice for
prosecuting attorneys to monitor the phone call recordings of pretrial

1.
Failing to stop when signaled by law enforcement is punishable by up to three years'
imprisonment. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-750(B)(1) (2018).
2.
Driving without a license is punishable by up to thirty days' incarceration. S.C. CODE
ANN. § 56-1-440(A) (2018).
3.
The sentence for a second offense of driving under the influence is between five days
and one year. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2930(A)(2) (2018).
4.
See Jessica Anderson, Recorded Jail Phone Calls Provide Valuable Tool to
Prosecutors,BALT. SUN (Nov. 4, 2012), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-11-04/news/bsmd-co-recorded-inmate-phone-calls-2012103 1_1 jail-phone-defense-attorneys-prosecutors;

Richard A. Oppel Jr., Calling Your Lawyer's Cell from Jail? What You Say Can and Will Be
UsedAgainst You., N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/22/us/neworleans-jail-call-lawyer.html; Wallin & Klarich, JailhousePhonesAre Tapped Watch What You
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detainees.5 In many cases, solicitors derive substantial, legitimate benefits
from having unrestricted access to inmates' telephone call recordings. 6 They
may catch defendants discouraging witnesses from testifying or victims from
pressing charges, 7 discussing schemes for meritless defenses,8 or revealing
incriminating details of their crimes on recorded lines. 9 Of all intercepted jail
calls, these are the primary categories of recordings that ultimately come back
to haunt defendants' 0 -and used for these purposes, they apparently further
the legitimate goals of a criminal justice system driven by the search for truth.
But there are much more insidious consequences of the practice by which
solicitors are given access to and use of inmate call recordings. These
consequences arise when the information obtained is not incriminating, but
rather revelatory of some element of the defendant's trial strategy." Pretrial
detainees make telephone calls for many of the same reasons we all do when
we have to leave home unexpectedly; they reschedule appointments, call their
employers, and reach out to loved ones to maintain a semblance of normalcy

Say,
S.
CAL.
DEF.
BLOG
(June
26,
2015),
https://www.southern
californiadefenseblog.com/2015/06/jailhouse-phones-are-tapped-watch-what-you-say.html.

5.
E-mail from E. Fielding Pringle, Circuit Pub. Def., 5th Judicial Circuit, to author (July
19, 2018, 9:36 EST) (on file with author).
6.

Telephone

Interview with Shawn Graham, Deputy Solicitor,

Lexington

Cty.

Solicitor's Office (Oct. 5, 2018).
7.

E.g., Susan Candiotti & Sally Garner, Recorded Calls Keep InmatesLocked Up, CNN

(Mar. 26, 2011, 8:09 AM), http://www.cnn.com/201 1/CRIME/03/26/jailhouse.calls.recordings/
index.html (noting that, in the case of Eric Persaud, a New York man facing charges for searing
his girlfriend's face with a hot iron, the prosecution found evidence of witness tampering in a
recording in which Persaud told the victim, "[Y]ou don't want to cooperate" and "I need you to
prepare the kids to start lying.").
8.
Bob Segall, Jail Phone Calls Offer Valuable Weapon in Indiana Sometimes,
WTHR,
https://www.wthr.com/article/jail-phone-calls-offer-valuable-weapon-in-indianasometimes (last updated Apr. 14, 2016, 8:30 PM) (noting that a jury sentenced capital defendant
Frederick Baer to death after hearing a recorded phone call in which he admitted to feigning
insanity by affecting certain mannerisms and changing his handwriting in order to get sentenced
to a nearby psychiatric facility instead).
9.
Elisabeth Hulette, Jails Are All Ears for Inmates' Phone Calls, VIRGINIAN-PILOT
(May 26, 2015), https://pilotonline.com/news/local/crime/article_6b7a0dl4-9245-53ad-bec9-

7cf67a4875fd.html.
10. See Telephone Interview with Shawn Graham, supra note 6.
11. See Telephone Interview with Shawn Graham, supra note 6 (noting that, while
uncommon, it is not unheard of for solicitors to overhear defendants discuss their trial strategy
in recorded phone calls).
Although there are abundant examples of cases in which the recorded information served
to inculpate the defendant, there is a deficit of corresponding cases in which defendants were
disadvantaged by the revelation of trial strategy. This can be explained by the fact that, in order
for incriminating information to harm the defendant, it must be revealed to the defense in
discovery or admitted at trial; in order for the defendant's trial strategy to be used against him,
however, it need only be known by opposing counsel. See infra pp. 992-93.
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while away from home.1 2 Unlike most of us, however, incarcerated
individuals also use telephones to make arrangements with bail bondsmen and
to keep abreast of their legal defenses. When a solicitor intercepts these calls,
she may seriously and unfairly undermine a defendant's case.
This interception of trial strategy or the very real possibility of itsubjects defense attorneys to this catch-22: either comply with the ethical
obligations to keep clients apprised of the circumstances and strategies of their
cases,1 3 or withhold that information from clients for fear that prosecutorial
monitoring will subvert their defenses.1 4 For defense attorneys and for clients,
there is no good solution to that dilemma. Under the first option,
unsophisticated defendants who are kept fully apprised of their cases and trial
strategies may have their seemingly innocuous statements used against them.
Under the second option, defendants who are already laboring under the
burden of uncertainty may be denied information to which they are entitled.
Under either option, however, defense counsel necessarily becomes less
effective than it would be in the absence of prosecutorial call monitoring.
In addition to their own knowledge, abilities, and collaboration with law
enforcement investigative bodies, direct access to a defendant's audio
recordings of jail calls permits solicitors to construct their cases "on wits
borrowed from the adversary."" In this way, prosecutorial monitoring of
pretrial detainees' phone calls seems to undermine "[t]he very premise of our
adversary system of criminal justice": "that partisan advocacy on both sides
of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted
and the innocent go free."1 6 Specifically, it diminishes the ability of only one
side, the defense, to engage in effective partisan advocacy.

12. Even neutral information such as this may be used to compromise the defendant's
bargaining position. If a solicitor learns of some external pressure upon the defendant to leave
prison, she can leverage this information to make a plea deal more enticing.
13. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.4 (AM. BAR. Ass'N 2018); S.C. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.4 (2018). The requirement under both rules that attorneys need only
"reasonably inform[]" their clients about their case status and the means of achieving the desired
results may provide a compelling argument that defense attorneys are not, in fact, trapped
between two losing options-if communication with clients would be unreasonable in light of
its potential for compromising their positions, the attorneys should play their cards close to their
vests. However, if the primary casualties of this practice are the subset of defendants who are in
jail and thus already less capable or aiding in their own defenses, and if the recording practice is
itself unreasonable, this argument might not be as compelling as it appears on its face.
14. Interview with E. Fielding Pringle, Circuit Pub. Def., 5th Judicial Circuit, in
Columbia, S.C. (May 23, 2018).
15. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring) (explaining
the importance of ensuring that communications and documents that are not strictly privileged
are nonetheless protected from discovery by the opposing party).
16. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975).
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The DUI arrest described earlier depicts both the value and the risk of
permitting solicitors to monitor the phone calls of pretrial detainees. While
you may have simply wanted to be certain that your friend could confirm the
events leading up to the arrest as they happened, you were caught attempting
to influence a potential witness's testimony on recorded and monitored
telephone lines. It is undeniable that the prosecutorial interest in witness
tampering is legitimate. However, the solicitor was able to use call recordings
made in the exact same fashion to listen to a marital communication and
obtain information about a conversation you had with your attorney, the
interception of which one might be reluctant to consider reasonable. These
distinct outcomes are two sides of the same coin.
Part II of this Note will focus on the history of the practice by which
solicitors monitor pretrial detainees' call recordings, the ways in which such
calls are used to support cases against criminal defendants, and the
justifications for doing so. Part III will confront the constitutional implications
and infringements inherent in this practice. Part IV will address the ethical
and practical problems with prosecutorial jail call monitoring, highlighting the
disparate impact on indigent defendants. Part V will confront the inefficacy
of current attempts to mitigate the harm posed by prosecutorial call
monitoring, and Part VI will present possible solutions that will assist in the
preservation of the rights of the accused.
II.

JAIL PHONE MONITORING IN SOUTH CAROLINA

Most jails in South Carolina contract with one of three companies to
provide their telecommunications services: AmTel,' 7 Securus,'8 and Global
Tel*Link (GTL).' 9 In the past, solicitors had to ask law enforcement officers
for access to call recordings. 20 One solicitor explained that, when he first
began using call recordings as a tool in prosecutions, the sheriff s department
in his county selectively sent his office links to download the recordings,
which expired after twenty-four hours. 21 At least two of these
telecommunications companies, Securus and AmTel, have since cut out the

17. See
Calling Options, AMTEL, https://www.myphoneaccount.com/Service/
Facility/Facilitysm.php?State=Rates (last visited Mar. 8, 2019).
18. Inmate Communications, HORRY COUNTY SHERRIFF'S OFF., http://sheriff.horry
county.org/Detention/InmateServices/InmateCommunications.aspx (last visited Mar. 8, 2019).
See also Detention Center: Telephone Services, GREENVILLE COUNTY, https://www.
greenvillecounty.org/DetentionCenter/Telephone.aspx (last visited Mar. 8, 2019).
19. Telephone Calls, S.C. DEP'T CORR., http://www.doc.sc.gov/family/Telephone

Calls.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2019).
20.

Telephone Interview with Shawn Graham, supra note 6.

21.

See, e.g., id.
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middleman, providing solicitors with information with which they can log into
the companies' web portals and obtain direct access to the inmates' call
recordings. 22 Securus allows those with log-in credentials to download the
recording in two formats: one, a locked audio file which cannot be edited for
any purpose; the other, a .wav file which can be redacted and enhanced as
needed. 23

This practice has been authorized by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act, which includes a "law enforcement exception" permitting law
enforcement officers to intercept telephonic communications as a routine part
of their investigations or when a party has consented. 24 Further, courts have
held that law enforcement interception of detainees' phone calls does not
violate the Fourth Amendment because there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy extending to calls made while incarcerated. 25
Through this practice, South Carolina solicitors' offices have access to
information they may be unable to obtain through traditional discovery
methods.26 Rule 5(b)(2) of the South CarolinaRules of CriminalProcedure,
which sets forth what the defense is not required to disclose to the prosecution,
states as follows: "[T]his subdivision does not authorize the discovery or
inspection ... of statements made by the defendant, or by prosecution or
defense witnesses, or by prospective prosecution or defense witnesses, to the
defendant, his agents or attorneys."27 Unfortunately, there are no citing
references as to this particular provision, nor have any committee notes or
comments been made publicly available to resolve the vagueness of this rule.
On its face, this rule seems to protect statements made by specified parties
(defendants, their agents and attorneys, and actual or potential witnesses) to a
smaller number of specified parties (defendants, their agents, and their
attorneys). It offers no reciprocal protection for statements made by
defendants or their proxies to actual or potential witnesses. Conflicting
definitions of what constitutes a statement enshroud even that interpretation
in doubt.28 In any case, the dragnet approach to recording inmates' phone calls
bypasses the discovery limitation imposed by the South CarolinaRules of

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. United States v. Frink, 328 F. App'x 183, 189-90 (4th Cir. 2009) (discussing the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006)).
25. State v. Martin, No. 2015-001065, 2017 WL 4641406, at *2 (S.C. Ct. App. June 21,
2017) (citing United States v. Hammond, 286 F.3d 189, 192 (4th Cir. 2002)).
26. See S.C. R. CRIM. P. 5(b)(2).
27. Id.
28. Compare S.C. R. EVID. 801 ("[A]n oral or written assertion"), with Statement,
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) ("An account of a person's knowledge of a crime,
taken by the police during the investigation of the offense.").
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Criminal Procedure to the benefit of the prosecution and the detriment of
incarcerated defendants.
In many cases, this approach also eliminates the argument that the
relevant statement is hearsay, one of the most commonly-raised objections to
the admission of call recordings in criminal cases.2 9 South Carolina's rule
against hearsay is substantively similar to that in the Federal Rules of
Evidence, defining hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted," and barring such statements from admission
into evidence unless subsequent rules provide otherwise. 30 Audio recordings
of pretrial detainees' phone calls are often admitted over hearsay objections
on the grounds that they are statements made by defendants as partyopponents or records made contemporaneously with the call "in the course of
a regularly conducted business activity." 31 Once again, information that
would be inadmissible in the absence of the call recording practice is rendered
admissible due its broad application.
It is noteworthy that this issue primarily impacts pretrial detainees. 32 All
jail inmates may have their calls recorded, but the majority of people in jails
have not been convicted of the crimes for which they are being detained. 33
Further, those are exactly the people whom the prosecution is most likely to
monitor; solicitors are unlikely to put much, if any, time into listening to jail
phone calls to build a case against someone they have already convicted. In
this way, pretrial detainees are significantly disadvantaged vis-A-vis
defendants released on bond, whose personal phones do not automatically
become subject to warrantless recording.34 Pretrial detainees are not only

29. Telephone Interview with Shawn Graham, supra note 6.
30. S.C. R. EVID. 801-802; see also FED. R. EVID. 801-802.
31. Telephone Interview with Shawn Graham, supra note 6; S.C. R. EvID. 801(d)(2),
803(6).
32. There are four reasons why a defendant may find himself as a pretrial detainee: (1) he
may be charged with a capital offense; (2) the court may consider him to be a threat to the
community or to a specific person; (3) the court may find him unlikely to appear for future
hearings; or (4) he may simply be unable to afford the bail set for him. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1715-10 (2018); see also Udi Ofer, We Can'tEndMass IncarcerationWithout EndingMoney Bail,
ACLU (Dec. 11, 2017, 4:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/smart-justice/we-cant-end-massincarceration-without-ending-money-bail (noting that the financial means of those accused of a
crime dictate whether they will be detained pretrial and suggesting that "[m]oney shouldn't
determine someone's freedom from incarceration").
33. Peter Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, Mass Incarceration:The Whole Pie 2018, PRISON
POL'Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2018.html (noting
that, of 615,000 total jail inmates in the United States, 465,000 have not been convicted).
34. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 373 (2014) (stating there is a heightened privacy
interest in people's personal cell phones); Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221
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limited in their ability to assist in building their own defenses,3 5 but they are
more likely to risk compromising those defenses by inadvertently revealing
information to the prosecution.3 6
Prosecutorial monitoring of pretrial detainees' phone calls is not a new
practice. Born of the necessity to ensure the safety of detention centers, 37 the
practice has grown through technological advances from physical recordings
available only upon request into digital records which are automatically
available to solicitors and detention officials alike. 38 This progression has
occurred so gradually that it has largely gone without either notice or
challenge, regardless of whether such a challenge is due.
III. INMATE CALL MONITORING AS A CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE

From a Constitutional perspective, prosecutorial jail call monitoring is
problematic. Implicated within it are the First Amendment's freedom of
expression, the Fourth Amendment's freedom from unreasonable search, and
the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel. While the constitutionality of using
recordings of inmates' calls against them has been raised and dismissed, 39 the
distinct question of direct monitoring of inmates' calls by solicitors has been
given insufficient attention.
A.

Reasonableness ofRestrictions on Inmates' ConstitutionalRights

Time and again, the Supreme Court has applied a different standard to the
abrogation of the rights of inmates than to similar restrictions of the rights of

(2018) (stating that law enforcement officers are generally required to obtain a search warrant
under the Fourth Amendment to obtain cell-site records).
35. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL MOVING BEYOND
MONEY: A PRIMER ON BAIL REFORM 16 (2016) (being jailed pretrial can also undercut a
defendant's ability to mount an effective defense).
36. See infra Part II.
37. In Turner v. Safley, the petitioners questioned the policy of the prisons in which they
were housed to limit mail between inmates at different facilities. 482 U.S. 78, 78 (1987). The
Court held that, although monitoring inmates' communications in order to censor that which
might threaten the security of the institution would be a reasonable alternative to prohibition of
entire categories of communication, the "more than . . . de minimis cost" of such monitoring
rendered it impracticable. Id. at 79. In the years since Turner, technological advances have led
to the automatic recording of all inmates' phone calls, and the costs of monitoring
communications, once deemed prohibitive, have since become de minimis.
38. A Brief History of Call Recording, VERSADIAL BLOG, https://www.versadial.com/
blog/a-brief-history-of-call-recording/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2019).
39. See, e.g., State v. Martin, No. 2015-001065, 2017 WL 4641406, at *2 (S.C. Ct. App.
June 21, 2017).
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free individuals. 40 Convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees alike are denied
the full scope of constitutional freedoms due to constraints inherent in
incarceration. 4' Nevertheless, prisoners still maintain some constitutional
rights to the extent that they are "not inconsistent with [their] status as
prisoner[s] or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections
system."

42

One must question whether there can be a penological interest with regard
to individuals who have not been convicted. Although "penology" is derived
from the Latin word for punishment, the Oxford English Dictionaryindicates
that the word no longer refers strictly to "[t]he study of the punishment of
crime," but also to the study "of prison management." 43 As the Supreme Court
reasoned in Bell v. Wolfish, the Due Process Clause prohibits the deprivation
of liberty of those who have not been convicted to the extent that such a
deprivation constitutes a punishment. 44 Nevertheless, defendants'
constitutional rights may be limited if the penological interests served by
doing so are the administrative needs of the detention facility. 45
Some identified penological interests are the deterrence of subsequent
crimes, the incapacitation and rehabilitation of prisoners, and, above all, the
safety of inmates and employees within detention facilities. 46 Although jail
call monitoring cannot reasonably serve to rehabilitate criminals, it can
theoretically serve to deter future crimes or incapacitate would-be criminals.
Inmates who would plan their crimes over detention center phone lines may
choose not to do so with the understanding that they are being recorded, and
those crimes which they do plan over recorded lines may be intercepted and
foiled by the monitoring law enforcement agent. Jail call monitoring may also
protect the safety of fellow inmates and detention center officials by exposing
smuggling schemes, escape plots, and inmate rivalries.
Conspicuously absent from the list of recognized penological interests is
the facilitation of a solicitor's case against a pretrial detainee. It may be that
the interest served by outsourcing the monitoring of detainees' phone calls

40. Compare Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 78 (1987), with Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374, 374 (1978).
41. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 521 (1979).
42. Turner, 482 U.S. at 95 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974), and
expanding the holding from its application to First Amendment rights to constitutional rights in
general); see also 1 MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 2:2 (5th ed. 2018).
43. Penology, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2005).
44. Bell, 441 U.S. at 520 (finding that "double-bunking" and cavity searches, among other
practices, did not violate pretrial detainees' constitutional rights because they were not punitive
in nature).
45. Id. at 523-24 (citing Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 124 (1978)).
46. Pell, 417 U.S. at 822-23.
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from detention centers to solicitors' offices is the preservation of funds within
detention centers. In theory, more resources can be allocated to directly serve
legitimate penological interests if they are not allocated toward staff tasked
with monitoring phone calls. In light of the breadth of solicitors' duties, this
argument has no teeth. Although phone call recordings are powerful tools for
solicitors in building their cases, it is unrealistic to expect solicitors to monitor
calls as they are made when they have other time-sensitive obligations such
as filing motions, responding to discovery requests, and preparing for hearings
and trials. Solicitors' offices cannot, nor should they be expected to, review
every call recording in such a timely manner as to ensure the safety of inmates
and jail employees. Detention centers still must allocate staff to ensure prison
safety. Providing call recordings to solicitors does not lighten that load.
When detention centers find it necessary to intrude on the constitutional
rights of inmates, they may do so only if the chosen regulation is "reasonably
related" to the interest it is intended to serve. 47 To determine the
reasonableness of a regulation impacting the exercise of detainees'
constitutional rights, the Court in Turner v. Safley set forth the following
factors for consideration: the nexus between the regulation and the neutral
government interest justifying it; the availability of alternative means of
exercising the right; the impact any accommodations for the right will have
on inmates, staff, and resources; and the proportionality of the regulation to
the issue it purportedly addresses. 48
The question of whether prosecutorial call monitoring satisfies the first of
these factors "whether there is a 'valid, rational connection' between the
regulation and a legitimate and neutral governmental interest put forward to
justify it, which connection cannot be so remote as to render the regulation
arbitrary or irrational" 49-is easily answered in the negative. Although there
is a legitimate government interest in prosecuting alleged offenders,"o there is
a countervailing government interest in "fairly and accurately determining
guilt or innocence."" When a form of regulation is effectuated in such a way
as to systematically provide only one party to an adversarial process with
inside information it can use to gain the upper hand against its opponent, it is

47. Turner, 482 U.S. at 78.
48. Id. at 78-79.
49. Id. at 78.
50. Brenda A. Likavec, Unforeseen Side Effects: The Impact of Forcibly Medicating
CriminalDefendants on Sixth Amendment Rights, 41 VAL. U. L. REv. 455, 463 (2006) (citing
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 755 (1985)); see also Tiffany L. Johnson, Mental Health-Crimes:
The United States Supreme Court Sets Guidelines for Forcibly Medicating Incompetent PreTrial Detainees Solely for ProsecutorialPurposes, 80 N.D. L. REV. 355, 367 (2004) (citing
Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970)).
51. Winston, 470 U.S. at 754.
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difficult to argue that the practice is neutral. Nor is the long-recognized
government interest served by the abrogation of inmates' rights-safety
within the detention center and the prevention of future crimes 5 2 properly
served by providing solicitors with direct access to the information obtained
from the intrusion.
The second factor is "whether there are alternative means of exercising
the asserted constitutional right that remain open to inmates, which
alternatives, if they exist, will require a measure of judicial deference to the
corrections officials' expertise." 53 In one case heard nearly thirty years ago,
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the propriety of a prison's
policy restricting the number of people inmates may call. 5 4 Ostensibly
applying the Turner factors listed above, the Court held that mail and
visitation privileges were sufficient alternative means of exercising the rights
the plaintiff claimed had been infringed." A closer analysis of the realities of
visitation and mail privileges agitate against this holding.
Today, there is little reason to believe that inmates' rights receive any
greater protection within their written correspondences in comparison to their
verbal communications.56 In addition to the fact that written communication
is much slower-and therefore less adept at addressing urgent issues mail
sent or received by inmates is also subject to monitoring. Advances in
technology have made monitoring inmates' correspondence much easier and
less costly. 7 While some detention centers in the state satisfy themselves with
opening mail in front of the recipient inmate to check for contraband," others
use scanning technology to create an electronic copy of the message which
must be processed through security filters and approved by jail staff before
being delivered electronically to a detainee's account.5 9 In either case, inmates

52. E.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979).
53. Turner, 482 U.S. at 78.
54. Benzel v. Grammer, 869 F.2d 1105, 1106 (8th Cir. 1989).
55. Id. at 1109.
56. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 517 (1984) (finding that inmates have no right to
privacy in their physical effects).
57. SmartJailMail Electronic Messaging System,
SMART COMM., https://
smartcommunications.us/services/smartjailmail-electronic-messaging-system/ (last visited Oct.
18, 2018).
58. Inmate Information, LEXINGTON COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEP'T, https://www.lexco.com/Sheriff/inmate.aspx?iid=vi (last visited Dec. 18, 2018) [hereinafter Lexington Inmate
Information].
59. Detention
Center:
Inmate
Mail,
GREENVILLE
COUNTY,
https://www.greenvillecounty.org/DetentionCenter/Mail.aspx
(last visited Mar. 8, 2019)
[hereinafter Greenville Inmate Mail]. Some detention facilities, such as the Greenville County
Detention Center, have also embraced e-mail services for inmates. Id. The program it uses,
SmartJailMail, monitors e-mails for designated keywords so that flagged messages can easily
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are likely aware of diminished privacy within their written communications.
Moreover, fifty-six percent of inmates "have very limited literacy skills," 60
further obviating the viability of mail as an alternative to phone calls. It is
unreasonable to think, without further information, that a paper trail would be
more accessible or secure than the spoken word.
Visitation is also an inadequate alternative. Strict limits are placed on the
hours during which a detainee may receive visitors, the number of visitors he
may receive at a given time, and the number of visitors approved to visit a
given inmate. 61 Beyond these limitations imposed by the detention center are
those inherent in life outside of jail; individuals who wish to speak with an
inmate may have difficulty obtaining time off work, childcare for the time of
the visit, or transportation to and from the detention center. Although visits
between attorneys and their clients are much less restricted by the detention
centers themselves, 62 the demands of attomeys' jobs make such visits highly
impractical as the primary mode of truly confidential communication. 63
Although visitation and mail certainly fulfill the communicative needs of
inmates to some degree, their viability as alternatives to telephone calls should
be reconsidered in light of the needs that phone calls uniquely serve. 64

be combed through by investigators, storing messages for up to seven years. SmartJailMail
Electronic Messaging System, supra note 57. This means that an inmate's e-mails can be used
not only to support charges the inmate is currently facing, but also in any cases occurring within
the following seven years.
60. Literacy Needs and Services Assessment for Midlands of South Carolina 15-16,
LITERACY POWERLINE (2012).
61. E.g., Inmate Information, supra note 58. See also Detention Center: Visitation,
GREENVILLE COUNTY, https://www.greenvillecounty.org/DetentionCenter/Visitation.aspx (last
visited Mar. 8, 2019) [hereinafter Greenville Visitation].
62. See Inmate Information, supra note 58; Greenville Visitation, supra note 61.
63. When attorneys are required to visit their clients in jail in order to communicate with
them confidentially, they must leave their offices, travel to the detention center, and pass through
multiple levels of security before ever seeing their clients. Public defenders must make such
trips to see only one or a few clients when their overall caseloads number in the hundreds. See
Meg Kinnard, SC's Public Defenders Crunched Between Cases, Cash, T&D (Apr. 15, 2011),
https://thetandd.com/news/sc-s-public-defenders-crunched-between-cases-cash/article_0d924
542-67a3-11e0-b9c8-001cc4cOO2eO.html. The time spent commuting and passing through
security is time that could otherwise be spent performing substantive work for clients. For
defendants who retain private attorneys, this wasted time also results in the accrual of hundreds
of dollars in legal fees before a confidential word may even be spoken.
64. For example, if a detainee wanted a family member's help to get a potential alibi
witness in touch with his lawyer before the witness was scheduled to leave town, the detainee
would have to make sure that the family member was on his list of approved visitors and wait
for visitation day, hoping that his relative could make it. Or the detainee could write his family
member a letter, which may or may not be intercepted by detention center officials, and which
may or may not arrive in time for his relative to get in touch with the witness. Or, more simply,
the detainee may call his family member. In doing so, he would be exposing information about
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The third Turner factor is "whether and the extent to which
accommodation of the asserted right will have an impact on prison staff, on
inmates' liberty, and on the allocation of limited prison resources, which
impact, if substantial, will require particular deference to corrections
officials." 6 5 The only accommodation necessary to protect inmates' rights to
communicate with their attorneys and others via telephone is simply to deny
solicitors access to inmates' phone calls, although additional accommodations
can be made to preserve-to some degree-the legitimate benefits solicitors
obtain from inmates' call recordings. Limiting access to those detention center
officials or their proxies tasked with ensuring the safety of the facility is
unlikely to impose any greater a burden on them than they currently bear,
except, arguably, when it comes to fulfilling discovery requests for these
records. However, this burden can hardly be said to be substantial in light of
the impact of the regulation on defendants, especially considering that
detention centers were responsible for fulfilling these discovery requests long
before transmission of audio recordings to solicitors became automatic. 66
Finally, we must consider "whether the regulation represents an
'exaggerated response' to prison concerns, the existence of a ready alternative
that fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at de minimis costs to valid
penological interests being evidence of unreasonableness." 67 Given that
detention center officials are already permitted access to call recordings and
solicitors could theoretically issue a subpoena to obtain them on a case-bycase basis, the fact that solicitors were ever provided unimpeded access to call
recordings seems like a highly exaggerated response to the burden of
discovery in criminal trials. The only legitimate penological interest served by
recording and monitoring pretrial inmates' calls is that of institutional safety,
which is not furthered by permitting solicitors access to audio recordings.
If a court holds as valid any constitutional arguments against
prosecutorial call monitoring, the conclusion that the violation of those rights
is unreasonable seems logically to follow. While monitoring and recording
inmates' calls seems justifiable in and of itself as a response to the need for
safety within detention centers, it is providing solicitors with access to those
calls that is a constitutionally problematic overstep.

his trial strategy to opposing counsel. However, it may be the only way to ensure that his alibi
witness would be available. Under such circumstances, the supposed alternatives are insufficient
to protect the defendant's right to hold the state to its burden in seeking to convict him.
65. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 78 (1987).
66. See Telephone Interview with Shawn Graham, supra note 6 (noting that detention
center officials previously had to send the Solicitor's Office links to download audio recordings
of inmates' phone calls).
67. Turner, 482 U.S. at 78-79.
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The FirstAmendment

Prosecutorial monitoring of detainees' phone calls can infringe upon the
First Amendment rights of both detainees and those with whom they
communicate by chilling their exercise of free speech. 68 Beyond the incidental
abrogation of the expressive freedoms of laypeople with whom defendants
communicate from behind bars, 69 prosecutorial call monitoring notably
results in self-censorship by defense attorneys with regard to which
information they tell their clients for fear of its falling upon the ears of
opposing counsel. 70 Moreover, defense attorneys frequently warn their clients
of the risks attendant to discussing their cases with anyone over jail phone
lines. 7 ' Armed with knowledge of the state's practice of jail call monitoring,
the best case scenario is that a defendant will also refrain from discussing his
case or anything related to it.
From a constitutional perspective, it is troubling that self-censorship is
the optimal outcome in response to a government practice. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly addressed cases in which governmental actions have
caused individuals to censor themselves, a result identified as an
impermissible "chilling effect" on First Amendment freedoms. 72 In Laird v.
Tatum, the Court addressed the effect of the Army's surveillance of political

68. A foundational assumption of the First Amendment analysis of this practice is that
criminal defendants have a right to make phone calls. This assumption, although contested, is
not without merit. In cases dealing with price gouging via prison telephone charges, the Sixth
and Ninth Circuit Courts have suggested that the First Amendment protects inmates' right to
telephone access, although the First and Seventh Circuits have found that no such right exists.
Nicholas H. Weil, Dialing While Incarcerated:Callingfor UniformityAmong Prison Telephone
Regulations, 19 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 427, 431-35 (2005) (citing Washington v. Reno, 35
F.3d 1093 (6th Cir. 1994); Johnson v. California, 207 F.3d 650 (9th Cir. 2000); Arsberry v.
Illinois, 244 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2001); and United States v. Footman, 215 F.3d 145 (1st Cir.
2000)). Among these cases, there is no common doctrinal thread joining or explaining the
diverging opinions. Weil, supra, at 436. However, given that pretrial detainees have inequitably
diminished access to justice in absence of the right to communicate with those outside of jails,
it would be wise for the courts to adopt a uniform approach guaranteeing the First Amendment
right of inmates to use telephones.
69. Procuimerv. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 396 (1974).
70. Interview with E. Fielding Pringle, supra note 14.
71. See Michael R. Buchanan, Arrested & Taken to Jail: Be CarefulAbout What You Say
over the Jail Phone, You Are BeingRecorded, DETHOMASIS & BUCHANAN, PA (Feb. 25, 2015),
https://reasonabledoubt.org/criminallawblog/entry/arrested-a-taken-to-jail-be-very-carefulabout-what-you-say-over-the-jail-phone.
72. See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972) (citing Baird v. State Bar of Arizona,
401 U.S. 1, 13 (1971); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967); Lamont v.
Postmaster General of U.S., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965); and Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 374
(1964)).
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protests on the First Amendment freedoms of would-be protesters. 73 The court
held that, in each of the prior cases recognizing a government-induced chill
on the exercise of speech as a First Amendment violation, "the challenged
exercise of governmental power was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory
in nature, and the complainant was either presently or prospectively subject to
the regulations, proscriptions, or compulsions that he was challenging." 74 It
held that the chilling effect stemming from the surveillance at issue, in
contrast, "ar[ose] merely from the individual's knowledge that a
governmental agency was engaged in certain activities or from the
individual's concomitant fear that, armed with the fruits of those activities,
the agency might in the future take some other addition[al] action detrimental
to that individual." 7 5

Prosecutorial call monitoring shares characteristics with both regulations
overturned for their chilling effect and those upheld in spite of the same. A
chill certainly arises from an attorney's knowledge that the solicitor's office
is engaged in the practice of monitoring her client's calls and from her
concomitant fear that, armed with such recordings, the solicitor's office may
use information divulged via telephone to the detriment of her client, the
defendant. However, that apprehension seems to exceed the "mere" qualifier,
presenting instead "an objective harm or threat of specific future harm." 76 A
substantial consideration in the Court's holding in Laird was that no plaintiff
could identify specific actions taken against them that contributed to the
chilling effect.7 7 In contrast, every defendant who makes a phone call is

subject to call monitoring,78 which presents a real and verifiable threat to the
prognosis of many defendants' cases. In fact, when the information obtained
from such calls can serve to compromise the defendant's bargaining
position, 79 bare knowledge, without more, is sufficient to shape the solicitor's

73. Laird, 408 U.S. at 1.
74. Id at 11 (citing Baird, 401 U.S. at 4; Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 604; Lamont, 381 U.S.
at 305-06; and Baggett, 377 U.S. at 379).
7 5. Id
76. Id at 1.
77. Id
78. See Monitored Jail Phone Calls Admissible Evidence, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (May
15, 2007), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2007/may/15/monitored-jail-phone-callsadmissible-evidence/.
79. Basic negotiation principles indicate that a defense attorney attempting to obtain a
plea deal for a client should first present an option lower than that for which he is willing to
settle. See H. WARREN KNIGHT ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 2-E (Dec. 2018 update) ("Make an offer that leaves room to negotiate: Expect your
initial offer to be rejected. Therefore, if you represent the plaintiff, make your first offer on the
high side of reasonableness, leaving room to make concessions in further negotiations.
(Conversely, defendants' initial offers should be on the low side, leaving room to come up
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approach to the case to the defendant's detriment. It is a bell that cannot be
un-rung. Like other practices found to impermissibly chill the exercise of free
expression, prosecutorial call monitoring is also ostensibly imposed as a
regulatory measure for the purpose of ensuring the safety of detention centers
and is compulsory to those who wish to maintain a connection with the outside
world while kept behind bars.so Because of both the nature and the impact of
the practice, a court would be justified in finding that the First Amendment
rights of pretrial detainees have been abrogated when solicitors are permitted
to monitor their calls.
C.

The Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment may also provide an avenue for relief for
detainees subjected to prosecutorial call monitoring. The law has long
recognized that recording phone calls of criminal suspects may run afoul of
the Fourth Amendment, beginning with Katz v. United States.8 ' In that case,
the defendant was suspected of illegal gambling activity, and in order to obtain
evidence of this alleged crime, investigators attached a recorder to the top of
the telephone booth from which he routinely made his calls.82 The Court held
that, although the booth from which the defendant placed his calls was
enclosed in glass and any passerby may have observed him without
obstruction, the search was unreasonable because the defendant's expectation

slowly.)"). The prosecutor, of course, has the discretion to accept a plea to a lesser offense. State
v. Thrift, 312 S.C. 282, 292, 440 S.E.2d 341, 346-47 (1994). In the best-case scenario for the
defendant, the solicitor would be willing to accept the first plea offered, and the defendant would
serve less prison time than he was willing to accept. Alternatively, the solicitor may make a
counteroffer somewhere between the defense's initial offer and the sentence that the solicitor
hoped to obtain at trial, which may align more closely with what the defendant discussed with
his attorney. In any case, solicitor may decline to offer a plea deal. However, if the solicitor
overhears the defendant telling someone about the plea deal their attorney considered attainable,
the defendant's initial bargaining position will be compromised. It is unlikely that a solicitor will
consider anything less than the charge or the sentence the defendant agreed to; he may even
negotiate up from there or, knowing that the defense attorney considers her own case to be weak,
refuse to offer a plea deal at all. The length of the defendant's ultimate sentence is likely to
increase because the solicitor intercepted albeit lawfully the defendant's phone calls.
80. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972) ("[I]n each of these cases [in which a chilling
effect was found], the challenged exercise of governmental power was regulatory, proscriptive,
or compulsory in nature .... .").
81. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 347 (1967). See contra, On Lee v. United States,
343 U.S. 747, 749-51 (1952) (finding that there was no Fourth Amendment violation when an
undercover informant wore a wire, transmissions from which were monitored by the police).
82. Katz, 389 U.S. at 347.
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of privacy in his conversation was reasonable. 83 Although the right to privacy
is severely curtailed in carceral settings,84 "the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places.""
1.

Third PartyDoctrine

Investigative agencies have been able to avoid the constitutional
interpretation of call recordings as searches via the knowing exposure
doctrine, also called the third-party doctrine, whereby information knowingly
relayed to a third party is not subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy.8 6
By communicating information to a third party, whether that information be
details of wrongdoing, trial strategy, or something truly innocuous, defendants
arguably forego any claim of privacy in that information. 87 On that basis, one
could conclude that it does not matter whether the conversation is recorded
and monitored. Communication of a private matter destroys the objective
reasonableness of the belief that no further audience will receive that
information.
The fact of recording, especially in light of the notice played before the
recorded phone calls," may further justify prosecutorial monitoring of
detainees' phone calls under the third-party doctrine. Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is rife with cases in which defendants were held to have no
privacy interest in information recorded by or simply transmitted through
companies as a regular part of business. In UnitedStates v. Miller,89 the Court
held that the defendant had no Fourth Amendment interest in records of his
banking activity because the records belonged to the bank, not to the

83. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (establishing the test wherein a person must
have a subjective expectation of privacy which society is prepared to deem reasonable).
84. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 517 (1984) (finding that prisoners have no
reasonable expectation of privacy within their cells).
85. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
86. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351)
(holding that garbage placed on the curb for collection was not subject to a reasonable
expectation of privacy because it was knowingly turned over to a third-party garbage collector).
See also Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REv. 561, 561
(2009) (defining what the third-party doctrine is and the doctrines controversial characteristics).
87. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) ("Neither this Court nor any member
of it has ever expressed the view that the Fourth Amendment protects a wrongdoer's misplaced
belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it. Indeed,
the Court unanimously rejected that very contention .... ).
88. See Ken Armstrong, A Phone Call from Jail? Better Watch What You Say,
MARSHALL PROJECT (Sept. 4, 2015, 7:15 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/09/
04/a-phone-call-from-jail-better-watch-what-you-say.
89. UnitedStates v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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defendant. 90 Likewise, in Smith v. Maryland,9 1 the Supreme Court held that
no search had taken place when the police installed a pen register on a
defendant's phone line to document the phone numbers he dialed. 92
"Regardless of the phone company's election" to record or abstain from
recording, "petitioner voluntarily conveyed to it information that it had
facilities for recording and that it was free to record. In these circumstances,
petitioner assumed the risk that the information would be divulged to
police." 93 This case applies directly to the practice of monitoring inmates'
calls, assuming, arguendo, that the information is indeed conveyed
voluntarily.
Third-party doctrine takes into consideration which information
investigators could obtain rather than which information they are likely to
obtain through other means. In the context of jail call recordings, many if not
most of the parties to whom information is relayed in phone calls before trial
will not be subpoenaed nor would they voluntarily cooperate with the
prosecution. 94 When a witness's failure to cooperate is the result of
intimidation on the defendant's part, 95 admission of audio recordings of phone
calls to or regarding that witness seems fair and just. Society would likely
consider the application of the third-party doctrine to be reasonable under such
circumstances to ensure that criminals are convicted. But solicitors need not
even try to interview a witness in order to admit their call recordings under
the status quo, let alone call them to testify.
In fact, an intercepted communication may be one which, under different
circumstances, would be protected by a privilege such that the other party to
the conversation may not be compelled to testify. 96 Considerations of what

90.

Id. at 435.

91. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
92. Id. at 745.
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Sarah Stillman, Why Are Prosecutors Putting Innocent Witnesses in
Jail?, NEW YORKER (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-areprosecutors-putting-innocent-witnesses-in-jail (noting that it is not uncommon for key witnesses
to refuse to testify).
95. In Baltimore, Maryland, Sterlin Matthews, a nineteen-year-old who was awaiting trial
for a murder in which the perpetrator had worn a mask, colluded with his friends over jail phone
lines to prevent witnesses who could place Matthews in the mask from testifying. Jessica
Anderson, Recorded Jail Phone Calls Provide Valuable Tool to Prosecutors, BALT. SUN (Nov.
4, 2012), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-11-04/news/bs-md-co-recorded-inmate-phonecalls-20121031 ijail-phone-defense-attorneys-prosecutors. Matthews was convicted after
these recordings were admitted into evidence. Id.
96. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-30 (2018) (prohibiting the compulsion of one
spouse to testify about communications with another, except in cases involving harm to
children).
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information investigators can obtain are greatly expanded via the third-party
doctrine at the expense of lawful limits imposed for public policy reasons. 97
This may not be an issue in and of itself when one considers that efficiency of
law enforcement has long been considered a legitimate government interest. 98
However, given the possibility that the information intercepted is that which
has deliberately been made unavailable through other means-specifically,
information about trial strategy the risks imposed upon defendants are too
great to warrant deference to investigative efficiency.
Further complicating the matter is that, in most cases, phone calls from
inmates to their attorneys are-at least theoretically 99-exempted
from
recording. 00 The same warning plays before their attorneys' calls as before
any other call made from jail,'0 ' but detainees are still entitled to attorneyclient privilege in their phone calls fromjail.1 02 If defendants could reasonably
expect privacy in their phone calls to their attorneys under the exact
circumstances in which it would be unreasonable to expect privacy in their
phone calls to anyone else, it is certainly not the carceral context of the phone
call-or even the recording notice-that diminishes the reasonableness of a
defendant's expectation of privacy. Inmates can use jail phones to have
confidential conversations. It is easy to understand why some defendants, in
recognition of this fact and of the substantial volume of calls made through
detention centers, expect no one to listen. 103
The Supreme Court has created exceptions to the third-party doctrine
when public policy has called for it. In Carpenterv. UnitedStates,104 the Court
recognized that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
cell-site location data, which cell phone companies collect as a routine part of
their business. 0 5 The Court in Carpentercharacterized the holdings of earlier
cases regarding the third-party doctrine as creating "a reduced expectation of
privacy in information knowingly shared with another," as opposed to

97. See GLEN WEISSENBERGER & JAMES J. DUANE, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE:
RULES, LEGISLATWE HISTORY, COMMENTARY AND AUTHORITY § 501.3 (2001).
98. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) (noting that police efficiency
alone is not a substantial enough justification to override Fourth Amendment concerns).
99. See discussion infra section III.D. 1.
100. See, e.g., Recordings Raise Questions About Inmate Rights, NBC NEWS,
www.nbcnews.com/id/26013015/ns/usnewscrimeandcourts/t/recordings-raise-questionsabout-inmaterights/#.VDnyefFE7A (last updated Aug. 4, 2008, 6:04 PM).
101. E-mail from E. Fielding Pringle, Circuit Pub. Def., 5th Judicial Circuit, to author
(Dec. 7, 2018, 12:56 PM) (on file with author).
102. See 28 C.F.R. § 540.102 (2008).
103. See Candiotti & Garner, supra note 7 ("We had one (mother) who said to her son,
'They may be listening.' And his response was 'Mom, they don't have time for this."').
104. 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018).
105. Id. at 2212.
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eliminating the expectation of privacy altogether.1 06 The court distinguished
Miller's bank records and the phone numbers dialed by Smith from
Carpenter's cell-site location information by emphasizing the "world of
difference between the limited types of personal information addressed in
Smith and Miller and the exhaustive chronicle of location information casually
collected by wireless carriers." 0 7 While the Court limited its holding to cellsite location data, it stated that, in the future, courts should consider the
"nature of the particular documents sought and limitations on any legitimate
expectation of privacy concerning their contents."'os It also cautioned
government agents against "uncritically extend[ing]" the third-party doctrine
to cases involving emerging technology.1 09 However, when jail call recording
technology transitioned from analog to digital and the transmission of such
recordings to solicitors became automatic rather than by request, the thirdparty doctrine was uncritically applied to support these changes. The
information made available through jail phone call recordings falls on a
continuum somewhere between the phone numbers revealed by a pen register
and the cell-site location information automatically gathered by mobile phone
carriers. `o Unlike cell-site location data, call recordings require some action
on the part of the user before information can be gathered."' On the other
hand, in much the same way that cell phones are "indispensable to
participation in modem society,"11 2 the ability to use a phone is indispensable
to a defendant who is trying to prepare for trial, arrange bail, and maintain
employment and family relationships. The third-party doctrine is not without
exception, and inmate phone calls fit the framework for what should qualify
as such as an exception.
2.

In the Absence ofIndividualizedSuspicion

If we accept that there is indeed a privacy right, however limited, in phone
calls made from jail, the issue emerges of whether those who would intercept
them have the requisite degree of suspicion to do so. On its face, the Fourth
Amendment requires that searches and seizures be conducted in a reasonable

106. Id. at 2210.
107. Id.
108. Id. (internal punctuation omitted) (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442
(1976)).
109. Id. at 2222.
110. See id. at 2210 (explaining how much information is available through CSLI); Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (explaining how much information is available through
pen registers).
111. Id. at 2210.
112. Id.
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manner." 3 Generally speaking, reasonableness requires that the police have
"individualized suspicion of wrongdoing" before conducting a search or
seizure. 114 However, a narrow exception to this rule permits searches and
seizures when individualized suspicion is lacking: The reasonableness of such
a search or seizure will depend upon its programmatic purpose and its
"connection to the particular law enforcement practices" used to achieve it.
The purpose justifying a search or seizure may not be "ordinary criminal
wrongdoing,"" 6 and the efficacy of a suspicionless search at revealing
evidence of crimes will not be dispositive, nor will it be particularly
informative, of its constitutional status." 7 The paradigm for suspicionless
seizures is the roadblock checkpoint: officers stop all or most vehicles
travelling along a road, briefly inspect each vehicle or its occupants for
evidence of the targeted wrongdoing, and either direct the vehicle to a
secondary location for further investigation if particularized suspicion has
developed, or permit it to continue along its route." 8
Jail call monitoring is, in essence, a telephonic roadblock-style
checkpoint through which inmate communications must pass in order to reach
individuals on the outside. Unlike drivers, however, inmates may be unaware
that they are passing through it. Furthermore, while those stopped at physical
checkpoints will only find themselves in trouble when police discover actual
criminal wrongdoing, inmates subjected to call monitoring also suffer harm
due to the interception of non-incriminating information. While highway

113. U.S.

CONST. amend. IV.
114. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 32 (2000).
115. Id. at 33. A series of cases validated traffic checkpoints for reasons such as
immigration enforcement and drunk driving interdiction when the circumstances of the
checkpoints were sufficiently related to their respective purposes. See United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976) (finding that Border Patrol agents have a sufficient interest in
illegal immigration to justify traffic checkpoints within 100 miles of the United States border);
see also Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451-52 (1990) (finding that the
government interest in curbing drunk driving is sufficient to justify a roadblock-style
checkpoint). However, when the City of Indianapolis created a drug interdiction roadblock, the
Supreme Court found it in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 32. The
Court classified drug crimes as "ordinary criminal wrongdoing" with an insufficient nexus to
public thoroughfares to justify checkpoints there. Id. at 41-42.
116. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41.
117. The Court in Edmond found that the drug interdiction roadblock violated the Fourth
Amendment, although it resulted in a substantially higher rate of arrest than did the immigration
and drunk driving roadblocks combined. Id. at 32-35; Sitz, 496 U.S. at 445 (noting that the arrest
rate of its checkpoint was about 1.6 percent, compared to 0.5 percent in Martinez-Fuerte).
118. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 545-46; Sitz, 496 U.S. at 447.
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checkpoints are almost always temporary," 9 jail phone checkpoints are
static-they last the duration of every phone call-and inevitable.1 20 In this
way, they are akin to a permanent roadblock at the entrance to the defendant's
neighborhood, and the defendant is subjected to a search each and every time
he wishes to engage with those outside.
While the practice has been justified in the name of safety concerns
unique to detention centers, the method in which the checkpoint is
implemented providing call recordings directly to solicitors-is
insufficiently related to the goal. Because the information gathered is often
used to fortify cases against defendants or serve as the basis for new charges,
the stated goal falls away, revealing the true target of the search to be
something much more akin to "evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing."121
The absence of individualized suspicion becomes obviously problematic
when prosecutorial call monitoring is categorized as a search. While there is
"no irreducible requirement of such suspicion,"1 22 the practice does not
clearly fall into a category of search that has been recognized as exempt.
Rather, it is analogous in many ways to searches which have been found
violative of the Fourth Amendment.
D.

The Sixth Amendment

By monitoring inmates' phone calls, solicitors compromise the Sixth
Amendment rights of pretrial detainees by diminishing the efficacy of their
counsel, discouraging them from participating in their own cases, and
undermining the sanctity of attorney-client privilege.1 23 The language of the
Sixth Amendment granting each defendant the right "to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence"1 24 has been interpreted as "contemplating a
norm in which the accused, and not a lawyer, is master of his own defense."1 25
Under this constitutional framework, both the defendant and the attorney have
critical roles to fulfill, and both are hindered by prosecutorial call monitoring.

119. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 448 (noting that the checkpoint's average duration was seventy-five
minutes); see also Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 552 (identifying three types of Border Patrol
checkpoints: permanent, temporary, and roving).
120. Privacy, SECURUS TECHS., https://securustech.net/privacy/index.html (last visited
Feb. 27, 2019).
121. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41.
122. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 561.
123. See NBC NEWS, supra note 100.
124. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
125. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 382 n.10 (1979) (citing Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-20 (1975)).
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The role of the defendant is substantially impeded by pretrial
incarceration itself; behind bars, he is unable to actively participate in his own
defense by helping his attorney gather evidence or find witnesses, for
example.1 26 When solicitors can use information revealed in a defendant's
phone calls to undermine his case, attorneys are loath to reveal any more
information to their clients than is essential for fear that their clients may
disclose it on recorded lines. This further erodes the defendant's ability to
serve as the master of his own defense.
Although the Constitution places attorneys in the role of mere assistants,
the criminal trial process demands much of the assistance attorneys
provide,1 27 particularly when their clients are incarcerated. Defense attorneys
are granted deference in their strategic choices, including filing and
responding to motions, conducting cross-examination, determining which
witnesses to call and which evidence to present, and deciding how to engage
in plea negotiations.1 28 Because defendants maintain the ultimate authority to
make certain decisions such as whether to accept a plea bargain, have a jury
trial, or testify, attorneys must communicate no less than the information
necessary for defendants to make these decisions for themselves. 129 With
respect to other, less imperative matters, attorneys should consult with their
clients and give substantial weight to their opinions whenever appropriate.13 0
The consideration of whether a defendant's communications will be
intercepted and trial strategy compromised adds another layer of difficulty to
the fraught collaboration between a defense attorney and her incarcerated
client. Defendants' Sixth Amendment rights are unjustly compromised when
opposing counsel is permitted to construct this obstacle to the attorney-client
relationship.

126. Oppel, supra note 4.
127. Due to the specialized nature of the legal field, a layperson with no formal education
or experience in criminal law practice would struggle to make the requisite tactical decisions
involved in her case unaided. In fact, in many cases where criminal defendants seek to proceed
pro se, courts have appointed advisory or stand-by counsel to assist defendants in preparing or
even trying their cases. See H. Patrick Furman, Pro Se Defendants and the Appointment of
Advisory Counsel, 35 COLO. LAW., 29, 29-30 (2006); Kevin Sack, Dylann Roof to Represent
Himself at Trial in Charleston Church Shootings, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/28/us/dylann-roof-charleston-massacre.html (noting that the
defendant's former counsel would remain on the case as "advisory 'standby counsel' after the
defendant was found competent to proceed pro se).
128. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-5.2 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2018).
129. Id.
130. Id.
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Attorney-Client Privilege

Although solicitors may be inclined to deny that calls between attorneys
and their clients are swept up in the nets of automatic recording,' 3' there is
reason to believe that such calls do not always escape prosecutorial attention.
The nature of the practice is such that, were a solicitor to obtain a recording
of a call between an attorney and his client, the breach of privilege may never
be proven unless the recordings themselves are turned over to defense
counsel. 3 2 Theoretically, any useful evidentiary information relayed could be
used to find external corroboration of the underlying facts. Alternatively, if
the conversation is strictly about trial strategy, the only indication that the
solicitor overheard such dialogue would be a well-prepared case which is
hardly a "tell" in a field where a high degree of competency is required.' 33
While it may be commonly assumed that the government will not record
attorney-client conversations, at least one jail in Columbia, South Carolina
has admitted to doing exactly that. 134
We need not rely on the admissions of jail officials to determine that
inappropriate monitoring takes place, though. The track records of jail
telephone service providers themselves present damning evidence of the
practice;
Securus and Global Tel*Link, two detention center
telecommunications providers active in South Carolina, have been implicated
in scandals involving thousands of recorded attorney-client phone calls in
recent years. 13 While there is no clear evidence that solicitors listened to any
of those recordings, there is also a lacuna of evidence that they did not, leaving
no way to establish that putatively impermissible monitoring did not affect the
plea offers that solicitors made or the strength of their cases. Under such
conditions, the interests of justice seem ill-served by granting the solicitor,
rather than the defendant, the benefit of the doubt.

131. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Shawn Graham, supra note 6.
132. See E-mail from E. Fielding Pringle, supra note 101 (noting that the Fifth Circuit
Public Defender's Office has received discovery containing attorney-client phone call
recordings).
133. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2018).
134. Oppel, supra note 4.
135. Jordan Smith & Micah Lee, Not So Securus: Massive Hack of 70 Million Prisoner
Phone Calls Indicates Violations of Attorney-Client Privilege, INTERCEPT (Nov. 11, 2015,
12:43 PM), https://theintercept.com/2015/11/1 /securus-hack-prison-phone-company-exposesthousands-of-calls-lawyers-and-clients/ (indicating that roughly 14,000 attorney-client phone
calls were recorded in a three-year period); Thy Vo, Company Under Fire for Recording
Attorney-Client JailPhone Calls Made the Same Mistake Twice Before, VOICE OC (Aug. 24,
2018),
https://voiceofoc.org/2018/08/company-under-fire-for-recording-attorney-client-jailphone-calls-made-the-same-mistake-twice-before/ (noting that over 1,000 privileged phone
calls were discovered to have been recorded).
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Nevertheless, when confronted with seemingly improper recordings of
attorney-client phone calls, courts in other jurisdictions have attempted to
resolve this issue by ruling that whatever privilege may have existed has been
waived when defendants place calls on recorded lines. 3 6 Specifically, the
courts in those cases found waiver of privilege when detainees were notified
that their calls would be recorded or when they failed to avail themselves of
alternative means of communicating with their attorneys in private, whether
through mail or visitation, or by having their attorneys' phone numbers added
to a list of numbers exempted from recording.' 37
Aside from the shortcomings of other methods of communication relative
to phone calls,' 38 these "opt-out" lists also provide inadequate protection for
privileged communications in two ways. First, opt-out provisions for
attorneys' phone numbers have often limited defense counsel to providing
landline telephone numbers, leaving all calls between inmates and their
attorneys' cell phones vulnerable to monitoring. 3 9 Second, even when a
defendant takes the necessary steps to have his attorney's phone number
added to an exemption list, there is no guarantee that his calls to his attorney
on the listed number will be protected thereafter.1 40 Indeed, when Global

136. Danielle Burkhardt, Read, White, andBlue: ProsecutorsReading Inmate Emails and
the Attorney-Client Privilege, 48 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1119, 1135-36 (2015) (citing United
States v. Novak, 531 F.3d 99, 103 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. Lentz, 419 F. Supp. 2d 820,
835 (E.D. Va. 2005)).
137. Burkhardt, supra note 136 (citing Novak, 531 F.3d at 103 (holding that the denial of
privilege applied even when the defendant was not affirmatively informed of ways in which he
could speak to his attorney in confidence); Lentz, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 835 (holding that an attorney
could visit or send mail to his client in order to preserve privilege)).
138. See supra pp. 987-89. Although attorneys are often given extended hours during
which they may visit their incarcerated clients, see Inmate Information, BEAUFORT COUNTY
S.C., https://www.bcgov.net/departments/public-safety/detention-center/inmate-information.p
hp (last visited Apr. 14, 2019), requiring them to make a trip to jail for what could easily be a
brief conversation is a substantial burden. When attorneys must also interview witnesses, write
motions, review discovery, and conduct trials for their other clients, who number in the hundreds
for public defenders, see Kinnard, supra note 63, attorneys must choose between their duties of
communication and their other job responsibilities. And providing the necessary information via
mailed letters is not necessarily a safe alternative, either, given the reduced expectation of
privacy detainees have in their property including legal documents while incarcerated. See
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 517, 536 (1984) (finding no violation of the defendant's
constitutional rights when a corrections officer searched his cell and destroyed his property,
including legal papers). In addition to the delay inherent in written correspondence, inmates
would still have no guarantee of privacy in letters sent to and received from their lawyers.
139. See Oppel, supra note 4; Rob Price, These 70 Million Leaked Calls Suggest that Jails
Breach Prisoner-Lawyer Confidentiality All the Time, SLATE (Nov. 12, 2015, 11:20 AM),
https://slate.com/business/2015/ 11 /anonymous-hacker-released-70-million-jail-calls-indicatingroutine-violation-of-attorney-client-privilege.html.
140. See Vo, supra note 135.
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Tel*Link was exposed for recording over 1,000 attorney-client phone calls,
the violation was directly attributed to the failure of detention center officials
to add attorneys' phone numbers to exemption lists.141 One can hardly

conclude that attorney-client privilege is given adequate weight when only a
fraction of attorneys' phone numbers are eligible for protection and a delay or
typographical error by a corrections officer could result in a violation
sufficient to compromise a defendant's entire case.
2.

Effective Assistance of Counsel

Despite the obstacles to timely, full, and frank discussions between
incarcerated defendants and their attorneys, lawyers maintain a duty to
communicate promptly with their clients and to keep them apprised of the
progress of their cases.1 42 Peppered throughout the Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility establishing this duty is language limiting it to
that which can reasonably be achieved.1 43 Sometimes, however, the condition
dictating the reasonableness of an attorney's disclosures to her client is the
unreasonable practice by which opposing counsel directly monitors the
client's communications. In no other context is an attorney entitled to direct
access to the unredacted thoughts and impressions of an opposing party; in no
other context are the stakes as high as when that party's life and liberty are on
the line.
Unfortunately for criminal defendants, the bar for an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim is often insurmountable. In United States v.
Cronic,144 the court held that a defendant must point to specific errors made
by trial counsel in order for an ineffective assistance claim to lie.1 45 When
attorneys have to choose between providing their clients with information
about their cases and withholding that information out of fear that their clients
will unwittingly divulge their trial strategy to the solicitor, neither choice may
seem exactly right, nor would either constitute plain error. Defense attorneys
may act to the very best of their abilities, and their representation will still be
less effective than it could be were their clients' phone calls exclusively
monitored by detention center officials or other parties disinterested in the
outcome of the case. While some of the information obtained through jail call
monitoring is of legitimate interest to solicitors, the Sixth Amendment costs
are too great to ignore.

141. Id.
142. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.4 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2018).

143. Id.
144. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
145. Id. at 666.
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IV. ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

Beyond the constitutional concerns raised by solicitors' monitoring of
inmates' calls, the practice also raises concerns with respect to prosecutorial
authority and defendants' rights. Moreover, the effects of economic inequality
on criminal justice outcomes are implicated, as is the broader conversation
about bail reform. In light of the issues posed by prosecutorial call monitoring,
we must seriously question whether the practice is one deserving of
preservation.
A.

From Your Mouth to the Solicitor'sEars

Prosecutorial monitoring of inmates' calls "ha[s] turned a body
responsible for detaining individuals to assure their presence in court"-that
is, detention centers "into an evidence gathering arm of the district
attorney's office."1 46 Indeed, there seems to be a logical leap between
permitting detention centers to record inmates' phone calls and permitting
solicitors to use these recordings in their cases. This is true whether the use is
explicit, as in the case of admitting such recordings into evidence, or more
subtle, as in the case of using knowledge of the defendant's strategy to
strengthen the prosecution's. In the past, incriminating communications had
to be discovered by detention center officials and delivered to the solicitor in
order to be incorporated into a case or form the basis of a separate charge.1 47
Now, corrections officials need never know about an incriminating phone call
or even receive a request from the solicitor to look for one. 148 The solicitor (or
those in his office, as the case may be) may access significantly more of a
defendant's communications whether they be incriminating, strategic, or
neutral-than at any point in history.
When courts have upheld the use of inmates' call recordings against them
in trial, 149 the result has been tacit approval of direct prosecutorial call
monitoring. The issue of whether detention centers can curtail or monitor

146. Joe Sexton, Using PrisonerPhone Calls to Convict? NY's Highest CourtPuts Critical
Question
on
Hold,
PROPUBLICA
(Aug.
31,
2016,
8:00
AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/prisoner-phone-calls-convict-new-york-highest-courtquestion-on-hold.
147. See Telephone Interview with Shawn Graham, supra note 6 (noting that the prior
version of inmate call recording technology required detention center officials to send solicitors
links to the recordings).
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., State v. Martin, No. 2015-001065, 2017 WL 4641406, at *2-*3 (S.C. Ct.
App. June 21, 2017).
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certain forms of inmate expression has long been settled. 5 0 Solicitors'
permission to benefit from the practice, on the other hand, has merely been
assumed. It is unclear whether a solicitor's right to admit a detainee's calls
against him is part and parcel of the right to access all of a detainee's recorded
calls, not just those determined to have evidentiary value by the parties
explicitly authorized to monitor them. Considering the rights jeopardized by
this practice, more than mere adherence to custom is necessary.
B.

Call Recording, Money Bail, and the IndigentDefendant

While all pretrial detainees are at risk of having their trial strategies and
bargaining positions compromised when solicitors monitor their calls, it is
indigent defendants who are most likely to be impacted. In South Carolina,
only three categories of individuals are held in detention centers before trial.
The first, capital defendants, are statutorily ineligible for bail."' The second
category is comprised of those whom the court, in its discretion, deems a risk
of nonappearance or threat to the community based on a cursory bond
hearing.' 52 These inmates account for approximately ten percent of all pretrial
detainees; the remaining ninety percent of pretrial detainees are those who
simply cannot afford the bail set for them.' 53 Unfortunately for indigent
defendants and for society as a whole, neither pretrial detention nor the
information solicitors may obtain from the resulting jail calls is necessarily
bound to result in more accurate determinations of guilt or innocence in
criminal proceedings.
If prosecutorial call monitoring were simply another mechanism used to
ensure that the guilty are punished, it is unlikely that it would provoke a degree
of concern substantial enough to motivate change to the practice. On the
contrary, it is but one piece of the puzzle that serves to decrease the bargaining
power of pretrial detainees to such a degree that they may plead guilty
regardless of whether they actually committed the crime for which they have
been charged. 5 4 Due in part to the mandatory minimum sentences

150. See Wagner & Sawyer, supra note 33.
151. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-15-10 (2018).
152. Id.
153. BERNADETTE RABUY & DANIEL KOPF, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, DETAINING THE
POOR 1 (2016) (noting that, for every one hundred criminal defendants in 2009, thirty-eight were

incarcerated in advance of trial, and thirty-four of those were detained for their inability to pay
bail).
154. See NATIONAL AsS'N OF CRIM. DEFENSE ATTORNEYS, THE TRIAL PENALTY: THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION AND How TO SAVE IT 17
(2018) [hereinafter NACDL REPORT] (noting that anywhere between 1.6 percent and twentyseven percent of criminal defendants plead guilty despite being innocent). Even when a
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accompanying solicitors' chosen charges,15 5 criminal defendants tend to face
higher potential sentences if they go to trial than if they agree to plead
guilty.1 56 For defendants who are incarcerated in advance of trial, the
likelihood of being convicted increases drastically as well. 157 When
defendants face both a higher likelihood of conviction and a higher potential
sentence if they do not accept a plea, they are under immense pressure to do
what they must to ensure the shortest possible sentence-that is, plead
guilty'-especially when there are people on the outside who depend upon
them. Although the state inherently has the upper hand in criminal cases, 159 a
solicitor may continue to gain leverage over the most vulnerable defendants
by monitoring their phone calls.1 60
Also noteworthy is the quality of assistance available to defendants
subjected to prosecutorial call monitoring. Although public defenders are
highly experienced trial attorneys, their excessive caseloads diminish the
amount of individualized attention they can give each client.16' Not only are

defendant faces a relatively minor charge, she may insist on a trial. But if she is unable to pay
bail, she will likely lose her job and experience strained relationships with her family while she
remains incarcerated. If the defendant is a single parent or one with little community support,
her children may even be placed in foster care. See Shaila Dewan, Family Separation:It's a
Problem
for
U.S.
Citizens,
Too,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
22,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/22/us/family-separation-americans-prison-jail.html.
Under
these circumstances, the pressure to do whatever it takes to secure a prompt release can be
overpowering. See NACDL REPORT, supra, at 9.
155. NACDL REPORT, supra note 154, at 7.
156. Id. at 5 ("Guilty pleas have replaced trials for a very simple reason: individuals who
choose to exercise their Sixth Amendment right to trial face exponentially higher sentences if
they invoke the right to trial and lose.").
157. Ofer, supra note 32 (noting that the conviction rate for misdemeanors increases from
fifty percent to ninety-two percent, and from fifty-nine percent to eighty-five percent for felonies
when the defendant is incarcerated in advance of trial).
158. Erica Goode, Stronger Handfor Judges in the 'Bazaar'of Plea Deals, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 22, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/stronger-hand-for-judges-afterrulings-on-plea-deals.html (noting that ninety-seven percent of Federal criminal cases and
ninety-four percent of state cases that are not dismissed result in plea bargains).
159. William C. Waller, The Beginning of the End ofPeremptory Challenges: Georgia v.
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992), 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 287, 292 (1993) ("The model
envisioned by the Constitution is not a model of symmetry between two equal parties. Instead,
constitutional safeguards exist to protect defendants against the imbalance of power created by
the unlimited resources available to the state in its prosecution.").
160. See discussion supra note 12.
161. Individual public defenders in South Carolina often handle far more cases than the
suggested limit of 150 felonies or 400 misdemeanors at a given time. S.C. COMM'N ON
PROSECUTION COORDINATION, CASELOAD EQUALIZATION 2 (2018); Kinnard, supra note 63
(noting that public defenders handled an average of 467 cases each in the 2009-20 10 fiscal year);
About SCCID, SCCID: S.C.
COMMISSION
ON
INDIGENT
DEF.,
https://sccid.
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indigent defendants more likely to wait in jail in advance of trial than
wealthier defendants as a direct result of their poverty, 162 but they are also less
likely than their wealthier peers to have open channels of communication with
their attorneys due to the varied effects of prosecutorial call monitoring.1 63
The way in which this practice is implemented is ostensibly equitable-all jail
inmates have their calls recorded but it is one of many factors in the criminal
justice system that leaves indigent defendants with substandard access to
justice. Given the odds against poor defendants in particular and incarcerated
defendants in general,1 64 it hardly seems just to permit solicitors to have direct,
uninhibited access to the recordings of their telephone calls. Because the
practice has only ever tacitly been accepted, it seems justified that it now be
explicitly rejected.
V.

INSUFFICIENCY OF CURRENT SOLUTIONS

At present, there are two purported solutions to the issue of impermissible
prosecutorial call monitoring. First, by warning defendants that their calls will
be recorded and by obtaining their consent before they speak, solicitors hope
to establish that the information revealed over jail phone lines is knowingly
and willingly disclosed.1 65 Second, in the event that either the warning or the
consent are deemed inadequate, defense attorneys could move to suppress the
contents of any such calls from the proceedings against their clients. 166
Although both of these remedies are well-intended, neither is appropriately
tailored to address the scope of the harm posed by prosecutorial call
monitoring.

sc.gov/about-us/overview (last visited Apr. 15, 2019) ("About 80-85 percent of all criminal
court cases in South Carolina are handled by public defenders.").
162. See RABuY & KOPF, supra note 153 (noting that thirty-eight percent of criminal
defendants are released from jail on bail before trial, while thirty-four percent cannot pay the
bail set for them).
163. Not only may attorney-client calls be monitored in spite of assurances to the contrary,
but public defenders have limited time to visit their clients in jail, and any information conveyed
by the attorney to his client may later be repeated on recorded lines. These concomitant
challenges serve to undermine attorney-client communications.
164. Ofer, supra note 32.
165. State's Brief on the Admissibility of Jail Recordings at 5-9, State v. Avery, No. 05CF-381 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2006).
166. FED. R. CRI. P. 41(h).
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Consent

The most substantial objection to any constitutional challenge of
prosecutorial call monitoring is that inmates consent to having their calls
recorded. While such wiretaps may be impermissible on phone lines in the
absence of notice, surely the fact that inmates must agree to being recorded in
order to place a call is sufficient to transform the nature of the recording from
an unreasonable search into a consent search. The automated warning played
at the beginning of these phone calls does indeed inform both the caller and
the person they have called that their words may be monitored and that, by
continuing to have a conversation, they are providing their consent. By
advising detainees that they will be recorded and obtaining their consent,
passively manifested as it is, detention centers seek to obviate the
constitutional challenges posed by the use of such recordings.
There are two problems with this strategy. First, research on the
psychology of consent reveals that individuals may not feel free to withhold
consent from those in positions of authority over them.1 67 Second, the
functional necessity of telephone calls and the absence of meaningful
alternatives further undermine the validity of pretrial detainees' consent. 168
In the philosophical struggle to determine whether laws should shape reality
or whether reality should shape the law, it appears that the courts have taken
their stance in the former camp on the issue of consent searches. 169
Nevertheless, reality has not fallen in line. 170
The standard for determining the consensual nature of searches or
seizures is thus: If a reasonable person would have felt free to leave, decline
the request, or terminate the encounter, the subject's cooperation is
consensual.' 7 However, in determining what a reasonable person would have

167. See, e.g., Janice Nadler & J. D. Trout, The Language of Consent in PoliceEncounters,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW 326, 332 (Lawrence M. Solan & Peter

M. Tiersma eds., 2012) ("Because people perceive discourse originating from an authority to be
coercive regardless of the assertive linguistic cues, authority figures need not use highly facethreatening language-part of that burden is carried by the badge and gun.").
168. See supra text accompanying notes 56-64.
169. See Nadler & Trout, supra note 167, at 337 ("[T]he Court assumes that citizen in that
situation clearly feels free to terminate the encounter or to leave."); Janice Nadler, No Need to
Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REv. 153, 156 ("In light of
mounting empirical evidence, it is remarkable that the 'totality of the circumstances' standard
has nearly always led the Court to the conclusion that a reasonable person would feel free to
refuse the police request to search.").
170. See generallyNadler, supra note 169.
171. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 429 (1991); United States v. Drayton, 536
U.S. 194, 195 (2002). Jail call monitoring is different from traditional consent searches in that
no individual law enforcement officer has directly sought or obtained permission to search the
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felt, judges have relied on their own intuition rather than empirical evidence
of how people actually feel in such situations.1 72 The evidence reveals that
people feel less free to refuse consent "under situationally induced pressures,"
which, although "imperceptible to a person experiencing them ... can be so
overwhelming that attempts to reduce them with prophylactic warnings are
insufficient."173
For example, a study of traffic stops in Ohio uncovered only a negligible
change in the rate of consent when officers notified drivers of their rights.1 74
One explanation for this phenomenon, derived from the psychology of
authority, suggests that police officers' power is legitimate only in part ; 1 the
remainder of their authority is coercive. 176 In other words, society grants
police the power necessary to conduct their work, but it also grants them the
latitude necessary to make errors in their work, leaving individuals vulnerable
and often without recourse when officers make the wrong call or escalate a
situation unnecessarily. On this foundation, the arguments proceeds thus:
If the officer administers the ... warning, in essence, the warning has
delegitimized his lawful authority to command the subject's consent.
If the [subject], after being given the ... warning, still feels he must
give consent, the authority of the police officer may not have been
founded upon legitimate power. If the authority is not couched in
lawfulness, the only source of social power that remains is
coercive.

17

detainee or the contents of his phone calls. See Drayton, 536 U.S. at 194 (holding that two men
on a bus subject to a routine drug search provided valid consent to the search of their persons
even though they were not told of their right to refuse consent). On the other hand, they are
similar in that the fruits of such searches have been deemed admissible regardless of detainees'
subjective ignorance of their right to refuse consent and the manipulative manner in which
consent may be sought. See, e.g., Nadler & Trout, supra note 167, at 330. Unlike, for example,
an individual detained at a traffic stop who may continue along his route after refusing to consent
to a search of his car, a pretrial detainee may not continue in making a phone call after refusing
to consent to having his call recorded. Although there are elements of call recording which may
seem to render them less coercive than other consent searches, these are counteracted by other
elements which heighten the coercive effect.
172. Nadler, supra note 169, at 167. In fact, even when lower courts have found searches
unconstitutional on the basis that consent was not freely given, the Supreme Court has
overturned those decisions and upheld the searches. Nadler & Trout, supra note 167, at 334.
173. Nadler, supra note 169, at 155.
174. Illya Lichtenberg, Miranda in Ohio: The Effects of Robinette on the "Voluntary"
Waiver ofFourth Amendment Rights, 44 How. L.J. 349, 373 (2001).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 364.
177. Id. at 364-65 (citations omitted).
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Circumstances are concededly different between jail and roadside traffic
stops.17 Although a driver may feel pressure to be agreeable in order to
conclude the traffic stop and resume his normal route as quickly as possible,
he is at liberty to escape the coercive presence of the officer as soon as the
traffic stop concludes.1 79 Inmates are afforded no such relief.
Instead, detainees must choose either to end their phone calls before they
are made, opting for an alternative that may neither adequately serve their
needs nor offer them more privacy, 180 or to agree to the terms of the recording
and simply hope that what they say will not be used against them. Because
pre-call warnings do not notify defendants that solicitors, not just prison
officials, will be monitoring their calls, their consent can hardly be deemed
informed. Neither, in the absence of any reasonable alternatives, should it be
presumed voluntary.
B. Suppression
When information obtained in the course of an investigation is not
discoverable or is otherwise improperly obtained, one simple remedial
measure currently available to defense counsel is the motion to suppress.'I8
The grounds for such a motion could be constitutional, or they could arise
under Rule 5(b)(2) of the South Carolina Rules of Criminal Procedure if the
party contacted is an attorney, an agent of the defendant, a witness, or a
potential witness.' 82 The limitations of the latter grounds for suppression are
apparent; while attorney-client privilege may be more scrupulously honored
were this remedy effective, no other constitutional issue posed by
prosecutorial call monitoring would be impacted. Motions to dismiss on
constitutional bases would likely prove ineffective under United States v.
Leon,'83 which held that the exclusionary rule only applies when it can deter
the unconstitutional actions of law enforcement officers.18 4

178. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 421 (1984).
179. Id. at 421.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 55-69.
181. State v. Rosier, No. 2015-UP-275, 2015 WL 3536564 (S.C. Ct. App. June 3, 2015)
(citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-30-110(A), wherein the process of motions to suppress intercepted
communications is described).
182. S.C. R. CRI. P. 5(b)(2).
183. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
184. Id. at 898. In one way of framing the problem, it is the conduct of solicitors, not law
enforcement officers, that is unconstitutional. Although they may qualify as law enforcement
officers by definition alone, Law-Enforcement Officer, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014), it is unlikely that courts would be willing to stretch long-standing interpretations of what
jobs constitute law enforcement officers in order to curtail a practice that can be addressed more
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There is a chance, albeit a slim one, that a motion to suppress a call
recording would be successful if the information obtained through it were
inculpatory in nature. If, on the other hand, the recording revealed trial
strategy, it would likely never come up in court and therefore be impervious
to suppression. The damage is done once the solicitor hears it.
Notwithstanding a more robust approach to suppressing inmates' phone calls
that reveal incriminating information, the risk of compromised bargaining
position would remain, as would the chilling effect on communications
between attorneys and their detained clients.
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

The nuances of the problems posed by prosecutorial call monitoring
should guide the search for a solution. Any remedy should be crafted in
consideration of the compelling government interest of ensuring the safety of
detention centers and those who live and work in them, " so it should provide
a method for ensuring that the telephone lines are not being used to plan
criminal activity. Furthermore, any alternative should minimize the burden it
places on detention centers' resources. 8 6 Finally, as noted in Florence v.
Board of Chosen Freeholdersof the County ofBurlington,117 "[o]fficers who
interact with those suspected of violating the law have an 'essential interest in
readily administrable rules,""
so any solutions must be clear and
unequivocal. The following remedies could serve to diminish, in whole or in
part, the deleterious effects of prosecutorial call monitoring upon defendants.
A.

Third-PartyMonitoring

One such solution would be to enact legislation prohibiting solicitors
from accessing defendants' phone calls without third-party review to ensure
that only information relevant to the solicitors' cases is turned over in
discovery. The appropriate party to conduct such monitoring should be aware
of the constitutional impacts of providing calls including trial strategy to the
prosecution, and they should be sufficiently thorough for defense counsel to

directly. Alternatively, because it is detention center officials and sheriffs' departments that
arrange for solicitors to have blanket access to inmates' calls, it could be said that they acted
wrongfully in facilitating the recording and permitting solicitors to access calls.
185. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 79 (1987).
186. Id at 78-79.
187. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318 (2012).
188. Id. at 338 (quoting Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001)).
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have confidence that no such information would be impermissibly relayed.
Only then would the chilling effect on attorney-client communications abate.
In light of these considerations, it seems that the optimal party to review
pretrial detainees' phone calls would be defense counsel. Because attorneys
may reveal confidential information to the extent necessary to prevent their
clients from committing crimes, this solution could be implemented without
compromising jail security. 189 Detention centers may retain access to call
recordings in order to serve their safety needs, but rather than requiring
defense attorneys to ask solicitors for access to call recordings, solicitors
would seek that information from defense attorneys or pro se defendants. In
theory, no funds would have to be diverted for this purpose because many
defense attorneys already review their clients' jail phone calls during the
discovery phase.1 90 The defense would then have the opportunity to redact
undiscoverable information before turning it over. The purpose of recording
calls would remain fulfilled, and the defendant would lose no rights in the
process.
B. Advanced Technology
Artificial intelligence may also prove useful for screening phone calls for
security threats. Much like the keyword-screening mail scanners used in
Greenville County's detention center,191 software can be used to listen for
distinct words and phrases indicating threats, obviating the need for continual
monitoring of calls by the detention center officials themselves. It could also
be programmed to seek out keywords in multiple languages, ensuring that
schemes relayed in languages spoken by few detention center officials or
unknown to them altogether are nonetheless thwarted. Such technology is not
as futuristic as it may sound. A patent was filed in 2017 for software that can
screen for keywords, trigger an alarm, and forward recordings to a monitoring
server in the event that a threat is detected,' 92 all while prohibiting anyone

189. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b) (AM. BAR. Ass'N 2018); S.C. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b) (2015).

190. Considering the underfunding of public defenders' offices nationwide, it would be
wise to increase their funding regardless. See, e.g., Phil McCausland, Public Defenders
Nationwide Say They're Overworked and Underfunded, NBC NEwS (Dec. 11, 2017, 5:55 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/public-defenders-nationwide-say-they-re-overwork
ed-underfimded-n828 111.
191. SmartJailMailElectronic Messaging System, supra note 57; Greenville Inmate Mail,
supra note 59.
192. U.S. Patent No. 10,027,797 (filed May 10, 2017) [hereinafter 797 Patent] (patent for
software that monitors inmates' phone calls, triggering an alarm and forwarding recordings to
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concerned with trial strategy from hearing any discussions about a defendants'
case. This patent has been assigned to Global Tel*Link, one of the major
providers of inmate telecommunications services in South Carolina.1 93 With
the use of this or similar technology, calls could be recorded much more
selectively, and only when they implicate legitimate penological concerns.
The use of artificial intelligence to monitor jail call recordings seems to
be a reasonable solution in light of the Turner test.194 Software that monitors
phone lines for keywords that indicate threats to institutional security is
closely connected with the neutral government interest of operating safe and
secure detention centers, and it is appropriate in light of the inadequacy of
alternative modes of communication or monitoring protocol. While this
software would likely bear installation and management costs, it would allow
detention centers to allocate their staff toward the more hands-on tasks
involved in jail management. The only calls that would need to be screened
by humans would be those flagged for security risks, saving substantial time
and increasing the likelihood that a threat will be detected in a timely manner.
Moreover, because the existing software is available to one of the state's
telecommunications companies, it stands to reason that many of South
Carolina's detention centers will not have to enter into new contracts with
another company. The solution may be as simple as requesting an additional
service. Finally, the use of extant artificial intelligence seems to be a
proportionate response to unchecked technological encroachments upon
defendants' rights.
Over time, this technology will likely follow the trend of other
technological advancements and become substantially cheaper.1 95 Given that
it is also more capable of responding promptly to the needs of jail safety than
are individuals, who cannot listen to all phone calls as they take place,1 96 there
is no legitimate excuse for indefinitely continuing with the status quo. In the
near future, all calls need not be recorded. Those calls in which defendants
reveal nothing more harmful than trial strategy or information that could be
leveraged against them should only be heard by the intended listener.

an output device in the instance of a "predefined event," i.e. some communication that represents
a security threat).
193. 797 Patent, supra note 192; Telephone Calls, supra note 19.
194. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 78-79 (1987). See also supra text accompanying
notes 47-67.
195. Matt Rosoff, Every Type of Tech ProductHas Gotten Cheaper over the Last Two
Decades Except for One, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct.
14, 2015,
2:20 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/historical-price-trends-for-tech-products-2015-10.
196. 797 Patent, supra note 192.
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C. Bail Reform
Bail reform strategies could also be considered to limit the impact of the
call-recording practice by reducing the size of the population affected; when
fewer pretrial detainees exist, fewer phone calls will be subject to monitoring
by solicitors' offices. This solution may fail on the last factor of the Turner
test as an exaggerated response to the scope of the issue posed by prosecutorial
call monitoring.1 97 Neither is bail reform sufficient in and of itself to address
the harms of prosecutorial call monitoring, as not all criminal defendants are
granted or even eligible for pretrial release.198 Regardless, bail reform is well
justified in its own right,1 99 and it would drastically decrease the number of
people impacted by prosecutorial call monitoring. As such, it should be
considered as a complementary remedy alongside any other measures taken.
Some such reforms should include the implementation of a fact-based
pretrial assessment protocol to determine which individuals should be
released on their own recognizance, denied bail altogether, or granted release
under restricted conditions like GPS monitoring or house arrest. 200 Indeed,

properly designed and implemented assessment protocols provide proof that
most arrestees can safely be released on their own recognizance. 201 South
Carolina currently has no such protocol; there is no list of factors that must be
considered in bond determinations, nor is there any indication of the weight
that should be given to any factor that a judge may take into account. 202 South

197. Turner, 482 U.S. at 78-79.
198. See RABUY & KOPF, supra note 153, at 1 (noting that four percent of all criminal
defendants are denied bail altogether). See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-15-10 (2018).
199. See, e.g., Ofer, supra note 32.
200. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., THE STATE OF PRETRIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 5 (2017).
201. Id.
202. Stephan Futeral, Making Bail All About Bond Hearings in South Carolina,
FUTERAL & NELSON, LLC (June 3, 2014), https://www.charlestonlaw.net/bond-hearing-bailsouth-carolina (noting that judges frequently consider defendants' community ties, work
histories, and tendencies toward violence). The risk of a defendant's failure to appear is often
the primary factor in considerations of whether to release him on bond and the amount of bond
necessary to incentivize his return to court. Lauryn P. Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, 85 U. CHI.
L. REV. 677, 688-89 (2018). This is in spite of the fact that failure to appear is comprised of
three distinct risks: actual flight, local absconding, and mere nonappearance. Id. at 683. The
latter category of nonappearance is much more preventable and correctible than the former two.
Id. Nevertheless, it is considered as an equal risk for the purposes of bail determinations in South
Carolina. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-15-30(A) (2018). Those who fall in the latter camp can safely
be released into their communities as they await trial, and additional safeguards can be
implemented to ensure their appearance. For example, courts may simply remind defendants of
their court dates a few days in advance. Where they have been used, court date reminders have
increased the rate at which defendants appear for their hearings. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY
PROGRAM, HARVARD LAw SCHOOL, MOVING BEYOND MONEY: A PRIMER ON BAIL REFORM
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Carolina's bail eligibility determinations make the process of depriving
defendants of their liberty before trial-and creating another avenue through
which their defenses can be compromised much more arbitrary than in other
states, despite the best efforts of judges to remain fair and impartial.
Just as the process of determining a defendant's fitness for pretrial release
should be revised, so too should the process of determining the amount of bail
demanded of defendants deemed fit for release. While bail amounts may be
low for indigent defendants, it is too often the case that a defendant's ability
to pay the required amount is not considered.203 South Carolina could follow
in the steps of New Jersey and eliminate money bail altogether, 204 or it could
take the more moderate step of simply enforcing the requirement that a
defendant's actual ability to pay be considered in bail determinations. 205 The
Supreme Court has held that it is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to
imprison someone on the basis of their inability to pay a fine for their release,
and therefore, courts must determine whether the failure of a defendant to pay
bail was willful and whether there are alternative means to achieve the state's
interests.

206

If magistrates were to strictly adhere to this obligation in making

bail determinations, significantly fewer defendants would find themselves
detained before their trials and subjected to prosecutorial call monitoring.
VII. CONCLUSION

Once again, imagine yourself in jail. You have just spoken with your
lawyer. You call your wife. You tell her about what happened the night before
and about the plea deal your lawyer suggested. After you hang up, you call
the friend who invited you over the day before. You tell him that, if anyone
asks, you need him to say that you only had a few drinks in the hours before

&

16 (2016) (citing Timothy R. Schnacke et al., Increasing Court-AppearanceRates and Other
Benefits ofLive-Caller Telephone Court-DateReminders: The Jefferson County, ColoradoFTA
Pilot Project and Resulting Court Date Notification Program, 48 COURT REv. 86 (2012);
WENDY F. WHITE, CT. HEARING CALL NOTIFICATION PROJECT (2006)). Courts may also
combat the risk of mere nonappearance by providing assistance to individuals who need rides to
court. This could be achieved by sending a deputy to escort the defendant to the courthouse, or
even by requesting a rideshare or providing bus fare to defendants who lack reliable
transportation. While this would pose an additional expense, it would undoubtedly cost less than
the $59.61 that the state would expend on the defendant each day she would otherwise remain
behind bars before
trial. Frequently Asked Questions, S.C.
DEP'T CORR.,
http://www.doc.sc.gov/faqs.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2019).
203. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, supra note 202, at 10 (citing RABUY
KOPF, supra note 153).
204. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., supra note 200, at 8.
205. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, supra note 202, at 8.

206. Id. (citing Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672-73 (1983)).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol70/iss4/8

38

Demer: Can You Hear Me Now: The Impacts of Prosecutorial Call Monitoring
2019]

CAN

You

HEAR ME Now?

1015

the arrest. You are hoping to ensure that he can corroborate the events as they
happened, but if a jury hears, it may sound like witness tampering.
The solicitor never hears these conversations. You continue to consider
the plea deal. Your wife comes to your bond hearing, and you leave with her.
Before entering into plea negotiations, your lawyer watches the video from
the officer's dashboard camera. The case against you for failure to stop for
blue lights is weak; you may not have stopped immediately, but it is clear that
you were not trying to flee. The video also shows that the officer improperly
conducted the field sobriety test, so it cannot be used against you. The solicitor
drops these charges, and the only ones remaining are minor traffic violations.
You agree to pay the tickets. You have only spent one night in jail.
To the degree that it permits solicitors to catch defendants implicating
themselves in crimes they have committed, prosecutorial call monitoring
appears to be a worthwhile practice. And to the extent that these call
recordings are admitted into evidence against defendants, it makes sense that
the practice has gone unchallenged for so long. However, solicitors have the
benefit of the full resources of the state on their side, 207 and they are able to
approach cases from the impersonal perspective as agents of the state. On the
other hand, a criminal case is always personal for the defendant, who faces
the deprivation of life, liberty, property, or a combination of the three. It is
unjust to grant solicitors unrestricted access to information they can use to
coerce vulnerable defendants into plea deals and to undermine the strategy of
those defendants who choose to exercise their constitutionally-guaranteed
right to trial.
The problems with call monitoring by solicitors implicate-and arguably
violate-the First, Fourth, and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution. The
practice undermines the duties that defense attorneys are ethically bound to
fulfill for their clients and bypasses traditional discovery limitations. And it is
primarily impoverished communities who bear the brunt of the practice. Poor
defendants are less likely than their counterparts with greater means to be able
to get out of jail before trial. Defendants who remain incarcerated in advance
of trial are more likely to be convicted. Solicitors, acting rationally, will
continue to use the information available to them to vigorously build cases
against the defendants whom they are more likely to convict.208 This cycle of
disproportionately prosecuting and incarcerating the poor may be
unintentional, but the current system perpetuates it. Limiting the tools
solicitors may use to bolster their cases against the most vulnerable defendants
will disrupt that cycle.

207. See Waller, supra note 159, at 292.
208. About SCCID, supra note 161.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2019

39

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 4 [2019], Art. 8
1016

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

70: 977

The alternatives available to prosecutorial call monitoring are varied, and
they are equally well- if not better-suited to ensuring that detention centers
remain safe for inmates and personnel. Regardless of the means by which this
end is achieved, solicitors should no longer be permitted to monitor inmates'
calls directly. After all, the costs of the status quo are too high to be borne by
defendants, and the expenses of solutions are too low to justify maintaining
prosecutorial call monitoring in its current form.
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